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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, after social media exploded with outrage surrounding the
sexual harassment and assault allegations against media mogul Harvey
Weinstein, hundreds of women came forward revealing personal stories
of harassment in the workplace.1 The most prominent alleged culprits
include NBC News anchor Matt Lauer, television host and journalist
Charlie Rose, Senator Al Franken, comedian Louis C.K., and more.2
This flood of accusations by so many women, many of whom remained
silent for years, poses a grim question regarding the effectiveness of
current anti-discrimination laws.
Quite conceivably, the failure to adequately protect employees
stems from the lack of protection provided by mandatory arbitration
agreements. Today, more than sixty million Americans have mandatory
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts.3 These clauses are
generally required as a condition of employment and keep legal
proceedings between the employer and employee out of the public eye,
often allowing the accused to stay in their job while pushing victims out.4
Arbitration, generally, is less formal, less expensive, and less time
consuming than a court proceeding, partially because it is run by an
arbitrator, instead of a judge, who is not required to adhere strictly to the

* Marsha Levinson, B.A. University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. Santa Clara
University. The research that went into this writing has been nothing less than eye-opening.
I would like to thank Professor Gary Spitko for his candid honesty and scrutiny in editing this
Note, as well as all of the other wonderful individuals who helped edit this article—especially
my partner Bradley Urso and my law review team here at Santa Clara Law. I am appreciative
to have this opportunity to publish my first, but not last, writing piece.
1. Dan Corey, Sexual Misconduct: A Growing List, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/weinstein-here-s-growing-list-menaccused-sexual-misconduct-n816546.
2. Id.
3. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-growinguse-of-mandatory-arbitration/.
4. See infra Section IV.A.
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law.5 It comes as no surprise then that throughout the last few decades,
as the number of employment litigation suits increased, many employers
have turned to mandatory arbitration agreements.6
Now, much attention is being paid to the expanded use of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts as well as the
attendant harms these clauses pose to employees.7 Some critique
mandatory arbitration agreements for stripping employees of their
substantive rights and call for their invalidation.8 In contrast, supporters
of mandatory arbitration cite the expediency and simplicity of arbitration
as outweighing the inadequacy of judicial review and discovery inherent
in the process.9
On its face, mandatory arbitration seems to insult public policy. It
deprives citizens of a judicial forum provided to them by law.10
However, perhaps we should judge the validity of mandatory arbitration
based on what is to be the best practice for a majority of people, rather
than on facets of public policy. In light of the overworked, underfunded,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and
backlogged federal courts, both employers and employees may actually
be better off with mandatory arbitration. This result, however, depends
on whether the mandatory arbitration system can offer due process
guarantees and fair resolutions.
This
Note
will
argue
for
the
continued
use
of arbitration agreements as long as certain safeguards are implemented
to preserve individual civil rights. Currently, most employees have
limited access to the court system.11 Arbitration is a supplement to the
court system that provides both employees and employers with a fast and
5. See generally THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKERMANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 49–51 (stating that arbitration should be more
attractive to employers for dispute resolution because it is less costly and less formal than the
courts),
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DunlopCommission
FutureWorkerManagementFinalReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
6. Elizabeth A. Roma, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts
and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519,
520 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Christine Hines, Righting a Financial Wrong, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Feb. 27,
2014),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/righting-a-financial-wrong-forced-arbitrationreport.pdf.
8. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 643 (1996).
9. See Kristen Decker & William Krizner, The Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson and
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch: The Continuing Viability of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Title VII
Arbitration Agreements in the Post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 Era, J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 153
(1998).
10. See Roma, supra note 6, at 520 (arguing that arbitration circumvents the traditional
judicial process).
11. See Decker & Krizner, supra note 9.
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relatively inexpensive alternative method of dispute resolution.12 If the
entire mandatory arbitration system were to be abandoned, many claims
would go unheard. In order to safeguard civil rights, however, the
current arbitration system must be modified.
Specifically, the
procedures currently in place are ill-equipped to resolve disputes
involving civil rights claims such as sexual harassment. Therefore, this
Note proposes the retention of mandatory arbitration but with specific
reforms that must be enacted by Congress in order to be effective.
Section II will provide a history of mandatory arbitration and
summarize the common societal perceptions towards mandatory
arbitration as well as recent efforts that attempt to address its perceived
shortcomings. This section will also discuss recent legislation regarding
mandatory arbitration and sexual harassment in the workplace, and the
“knowing and voluntary standard”13 for the fair enforcement of
compulsory arbitration agreements.
Section III will identify the issues analyzed in this Note and Section
IV will then delve into the legal and sociological literature on mandatory
arbitration and sexual harassment in the workplace in order to analyze
why existing laws against sexual harassment fail to be preventative. This
analysis will also discuss the role of arbitration in perpetuating harassing
work environments and will use Fox News as a case study, highlighting
some approaches for rectifying the problem.
Finally, this Note will suggest that a more regulated system of
arbitration is needed, reformed to serve the needs of employees. In order
to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the use of mandatory arbitration,
this Note proposes that Congress amend the Federal Arbitration Act to
grant States some authority to regulate arbitration and discusses potential
strategies for doing so.
II. BACKGROUND
The emergence of mandatory arbitration over the last few decades
has changed our legal system considerably.14 While arbitration has
historically been used as an alternative to litigation, in the past it was
knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon, often by two or more businesses
who had equal bargaining power.15 With the encouragement of the

12. See David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 100 (1999) [hereinafter Sherwyn et al., Mandatory
Arbitration] (“For employers, the reduced cost, increased speed, private nature, and
elimination of juries make arbitration an attractive option.”).
13. See infra Section II.F.
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. Id.
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United States Supreme Court, businesses jumped at the opportunity to
mandate arbitration of future employment disputes rather than allow
those disputes to be brought in court.16 Today, the involuntary
imposition of arbitration in employment agreements has become a
controversial topic.17
A. What Are Mandatory Arbitration Agreements?
Throughout the last few decades, mandatory arbitration clauses
have become increasingly prevalent in employment contracts.18 A
mandatory arbitration agreement, generally referred to as a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement, is an agreement between an employer and
employee to resolve future employment disputes by binding
arbitration.19 Employers will include arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment, tailoring agreements as they see fit.20
Mandatory arbitration agreements can be inserted into employment
contracts, employee handbooks, or stand-alone agreements.21
Arbitration agreements can be broad, covering a variety of employment
disputes, or can be more limited, covering only particular disputes.22
Additionally, employers can either adopt rules for the arbitration
proceeding from a neutral agency, such as the American Arbitration
Association, or may formulate their own rules.23 Arbitration places total
control of a dispute into the hands of a third party by allowing the
arbitrator to render a binding decision on behalf of the parties.24
B. What are the Benefits and Drawbacks of Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements in the Employment Context?
Scholars, judges, and legislators are in hot debate over the fairness
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims.25 Critics cite the “disparity
of bargaining power between employers and employees, the involuntary

16. Id.
17. See infra Section II.B.ii.
18. See Colvin, supra note 3.
19. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide
to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 594
(1995).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 594–95.
23. Id. at 595.
24. Robert J. Landry & Benjamin Hardy, Mandatory Pre-Employment Arbitration
Agreements: The Scattering, Smothering and Covering of Employee Rights, 19 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 479, 483 (2008).
25. Marcela Noemi Siderman, Comment, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth
Saving: Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title VII Protections, 47 UCLA L. REV .
1885, 1892 (2000).
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nature of the arbitral process, the lack of judicial guidance and oversight,
and the submersion of important public law matters into a private
process” to rationalize why compulsory arbitration of statutory claims
should not be enforced.26 In sum, critics fear that the process generates
pro-employer outcomes at the expense of employees’ rights. On the
other hand, proponents of mandatory arbitration argue that efficiency
and accessibility to a legal forum are critical benefits of this system.27
Others make the point that effective arbitration allows more claims to be
resolved before the employment relationship suffers irreversible harm.28
Generally, supporters feel as if mandatory arbitration actually provides
employees with a better chance at resolving their dispute.29
1. Benefits of Mandatory Arbitration
Advocates of mandatory arbitration see it as a protection against the
“evils” of litigation.30 The virtues of mandatory arbitration parallel that
of arbitration, generally. In addition to being less expensive, arbitration
offers a more informed, timely, and private resolution of the dispute than
litigation.31 Particularly in an employment context, the less formal
resolution of arbitration may be useful in preserving a positive
employment relationship that may otherwise be harmed by lengthy
litigation.32 Arguably, one of the greatest attributes of arbitration is the
ability to select a decision maker with expertise in employment law
matters.33 This allows for a more informed and predictable decision on

26. Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 350
(1997).
27. Eljer Mfg. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[Arbitration]
is a private system of justice offering benefits of reduced delay and expense.”).
28. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1893.
29. See id.
30. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 UNLV L. REV.
1631, 1638 (2005) (listing the “evils of litigation” as: publicity, jury awards, punitive
damages, extensive discovery, and class actions) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration].
31. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 12.
32. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564
(2001) (arguing that “unlike litigation where resolutions often come too late and the process
itself is so divisive that reinstatement is rarely practicable, arbitration holds out the promise
of a prompt resolution more suitable for claims by incumbent employees or even former
employees truly desiring reinstatement”).
33. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449, 455 (1996).
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the merits and, more importantly, a decision that both parties are likely
to accept as legitimate.34
For the court system, mandatory arbitration increases judicial
efficiency by reducing the courts’ docket.35 Without arbitration, court
dockets would become severely overloaded with claims that could each
take several years to even reach trial.36
Mandatory arbitration also presents benefits for employees. For
example, arbitration can be less intimidating than the court system,37 and
arbitration of employment discrimination claims generally takes less
than half the time it takes to litigate them.38 Additionally, because it is
difficult for employees to retain competent legal counsel for routine or
marginal cases,39 many employees may not be able to properly enforce
their in court.40 As any law student will tell you, the rules of evidence
within the courtroom are no joke—and certainly not something a lay
person can quickly learn. Arbitration, by contrast, provides a sure forum
to have employees’ problems addressed by an informed neutral.41
Additionally, the lower monetary cost of arbitration, coupled with its
informal nature, allows some employees to bring claims that they
otherwise would not have been able to bring in court.42
34. See Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 13 (Edward Brunet et al. eds., 2006) (“Trust of the
expert arbitrator is essential to support the concept of finality.”). Cf. Mark C. Weidemaier,
From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843, 866 (2008) (suggesting that “[u]nlike judges,
arbitrators can be selected for their sensitivity to local context, which might plausibly make
them superior to courts at tailoring public norms to specific workplaces, not to mention better
able to identify or create workplace-specific norms in areas not governed by external law”).
35. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (citing the House
report developed at the enactment of the FAA stating “[i]t is practically appropriate that the
action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and
delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if
arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable”).
36. Id.
37. Donna R. Milhouse, Agreements to Arbitrate: Facilitating Employment Dispute
Resolution of Statutory Claims, 74 MICH. BUS. L.J. 1158, 1161 (1995).
38. See Richard A. Bales, A Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at
Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 343 (2006).
39. See Siderman, supra note 25, at 1894.
40. Id. at 1894–95.
41. Id.
42. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims:
Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 8 (1998); Susan A.
Fitzgibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment
Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1412 (2000) (concluding that “[b]ased on experience in
labor arbitration, pro se representation may also be used more effectively and with fewer risks
than in court because of the more informal nature of arbitration”); Robert A. Gorman, The
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
635, 651–52 (asserting that “the savings in time and expense that arbitration brings may allow
an employee to pursue claims that he or she would otherwise be reluctant or unable to press”).
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Finally, proponents weigh the drawback of not being able to bring
a claim in court against the notion of not having the ability to arbitrate at
all. For employees who lack a mandatory arbitration agreement,
voluntary arbitration becomes unlikely.43 It is unlikely that employers,
knowing that an employee cannot bring a claim to court, will volunteer
to arbitrate the same claim.44 If, however, employers are bound to
arbitrate, any claim will be heard.45
2. Three Major Critiques of Mandatory Arbitration
Critics’ argument that mandatory arbitration is detrimental and
unfair to individuals has many subparts; however, this Note will focus
on three major critiques relating to the sexual-harassment-in-theworkplace predicament. The first concern regards the arguably
nonconsensual nature of mandatory arbitration. The second concern is
that employers enjoy informational and bargaining advantages over
employees, and in using these advantages, may impose an arbitration
process that favors the employer even more. And the final critique arises
in the context of mandatory arbitration of statutory right claims such as
Title VII discrimination.
a. The Nonconsensual Nature of Pre-dispute Arbitration
Agreements
One major critique pertaining to mandatory arbitration is that the
agreements are essentially nonconsensual because employees do not
typically read or understand arbitration clauses, and even if they do, have
no option but to sign them.46 This critique stems from the broader
concern that employers often use their disproportionate bargaining
powers to make employees sign arbitration agreements that grossly favor
the employer.47

43. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1894.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND
EXPERIMENT
IN
EMPLOYMENT
8
n.87
(1997))
(arguing
that
while
compulsory arbitration prevents one percent of claimants who could get a lawyer to take their
case from going to court, it opens up a forum for those claimants who would otherwise be
shut out of the system because their claims are too small); see also Eric Schnapper, Advocates
Deterred by Fee Issues, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at C1.
46. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649 (“even to the
extent that consumers might read and understand an arbitration clause imposed on a predispute
basis, psychologists have shown that predictable irrationality biases will prevent them from
properly evaluating the costs and benefits of accepting such a clause.”).
47. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(3), (7) (2009)
(asserting that “[m]ost consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether
to submit their claims to arbitration . . . “and that “[m]any corporations add to their arbitration
clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against individuals . . . . “).
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Empirical studies show that only a miniscule percentage of adults
read form agreements, and of these, an even smaller number understand
what they read.48 Moreover, even if individuals read and understand
mandatory arbitration clauses, employment contracts are offered on a
“take it or leave it” basis.49 As a result, individuals who are limited in
employment options have little choice but to sign such agreements. In
addition, people tend to be overly optimistic, and often under-predict the
need they might have to bring a future claim and thus undervalue what
they are losing by giving up the right to sue (i.e. the right to bring
employment related claims to trial before a judge or jury).50
Courts view arbitration clauses as legitimate because they see the
clauses as a bargained-for element of a contract.51 Contracts are to be
upheld when two parties voluntarily agree to be bound without undue
influence or other unconscionable factors.52 However, more often than
not, parties to mandatory arbitration contracts are not on equal footing—
for precisely the reasons described above. In short, the typical employee
lacks the knowledge or ability to make an informed decision with respect
to such an agreement.53 The lack of understanding of what arbitration
entails prohibits employees from properly consenting to the agreement.
As a result of this nonconsensual nature of the contract, critics urge that
mandatory arbitration is wrong as a matter of public policy.54
b. Structural and Procedural Concerns
A second major critique of mandatory arbitration agreements is that
they may often be slanted in favor of the business.55 Instead of judges,
arbitration cases are decided by arbitrators, hired by companies that
routinely give them business.56 Critics argue that a “repeat provider”
48. See Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 233 (2002) (analyzing literacy research which shows that a surprisingly high
percentage of literate adults are unable to extract pertinent information from form contracts);
Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1059–60 (1998).
49. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding
that many employees are not able to negotiate the terms of their employment contract).
50. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 39 (2000); Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649.
51. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (noting that the
legislative intent behind the FAA was to put arbitration agreements on the same level as other
contracts).
52. See id. (expressing the importance of upholding contracts).
53. Haagen, supra note 48, at 1059.
54. See EEOC Notice Number 915.002, Section VII, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, (July 10, 1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html
[hereinafter EEOC Notice].
55. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649–50.
56. Id.
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problem arises when companies give this repeat business to arbitrators.57
Essentially, they fear that arbitrators may become biased toward the
employer if the employer frequently uses their services.58 Although
providers vehemently deny the charge that they are biased, critics
maintain that, consciously or subconsciously, arbitrators may slant the
result in companies’ favor in order to retain business.59
Even if arbitrators are not biased, employers still have the
advantage of being a “repeat player.”60 The idea here is that employees
who participate in arbitration are hindered because (1) they lack
information about arbitrators (such as experience and previous
employment), and (2) they have less experience than employers who
have likely participated in arbitration proceedings before.61
Of course, while there exists extensive empirical data supporting
the “repeat player” effect, some scholars have pointed out that the data
is ultimately misleading because it includes a large proportion of claims
by lower-paid employees who may choose the arbitral process even for
frivolous claims, because it is often free.62 Other scholars argue that
even if a repeat player effect does exist, litigation, too, provides such an
effect for lawyers who represent employers and employees in court.
However, because lawyers are more likely to take claims going to
litigation (as opposed to arbitration) due to the potential for higher
earnings,63 the scale of fairness is more balanced in litigation.
c. Concerns Relating to Statutory Claims
The final concern arises when mandatory arbitration is applied to
Title VII and other statutory rights actions. Mainly, critics of
employment arbitration argue that it does not serve the policy goals of
57. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 35–37 (1999).
58. Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration
Agreements, with Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665,
698–99 (2010).
59. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1650.
60. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV .
95, 97–104 (1974) (explicating typology of parties that divides litigants into “repeat players”
and “one-shotters” and discussing each type of party’s incentives and advantages in legal
system).
61. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 208–13 (1997) (reporting results of her study on employment
arbitrations, in which employees win less frequently and win less of what they demanded
when arbitrating against repeat-player employer as compared to when arbitrating against oneshot employer); Russell Evans, Note, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.: Can
Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts Survive a “Fairness” Analysis?, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 635, 644 (1999).
62. See Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded
Neutrals, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 495, 530 (2010).
63. Bingham, supra note 61, at 198–99.
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anti-discrimination laws as well as a court proceeding would.64
Opponents believe that arbitration proceedings evade public
accountability, and that compared to public adjudication, arbitration is
less effective at general deterrence and development of legal precedent.65
The argument pertaining to accountability is that the private nature
of mandatory arbitration prevents employees from holding their
employers accountable to the public. Employers are less likely to learn
of an arbitration outcome that punishes another employer’s
discrimination.66 When a matter is addressed by the court, however,
other employers are exposed to the resulting consequences and are thus
deterred from engaging in discrimination themselves.67
A confidential forum also denies the public access to knowledge of
harmful business practices, such as sexua harassment and
discrimination.68 While arbitration often results in a private award,
litigation of discrimination claims develops and refines legal precedent
and educates the public about the legality of certain employment
practices.69 This developed law not only governs future disputes, but
also provides employers with guidelines for appropriate conduct and
reinforces cultural norms that disavow invidious discrimination.70
The lack of public accountability and transparency addressed here
will be further explored in this Note, illuminating it as one factor that
must be changed in order to make mandatory arbitration fairer for
employees.71

64. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination
Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 396 (1999) (arguing that “arbitration is not an effective
forum in which to satisfy the public goals of employment discrimination statutes, even when
employees are accorded a fair hearing”).
65. Id. at 400, 437–38.
66. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, reprinted in 133 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) at V-A-1 (July 11, 1997) (arguing that arbitration’s private nature weakens general
deterrence).
67. Id. at IV-C (July 11, 1997) (“By awarding damages, backpay, and injunctive relief
as a matter of public record, the courts not only compensate victims of discrimination, but
provide notice to the community, in a very tangible way, of the costs of discrimination.”).
68. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 197
(finding that cases outside of the public forum allow fewer people to engage in dialogue on
the issue); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1995)
(stating that litigation reveals incidents of discrimination that may impact the entire industry).
69. EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 66, at IV-A (noting that “[a]bsent the role of the
courts, there might be no discrimination claims today based on, for example, the adverse
impact of neutral practices not justified by business necessity, . . .or sexual harassment . . . “);
Moohr, supra note 64, at 432.
70. Moohr, supra note 64, at 400, 437–38 (“In articulating the standard of acceptable
conduct, an adjudication reaffirms these values and forms community standards.”).
71. See infra Section IV.B.iii.
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C. The Evolution of Mandatory Arbitration in the United States
Voluntary binding arbitration has a long and mostly honorable
history in the United States.72 Traditionally, businesses sought to resolve
disputes through binding arbitration because of the expertise, speed,
efficiency, privacy, and neutral decision makers that arbitration
provided.73 Internationally, arbitration is favored because it allows
businesses to feel secure against potential biases from another country’s
courts and to obtain results that are more enforceable in another country
than a court decree.74 Courts themselves have traditionally supported
voluntary binding arbitration, enforcing both arbitral awards and postdispute agreements to arbitrate.75 However, pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate, i.e. mandatory arbitration clauses, have a more complex
history, with courts originally refusing to enforce them.76 This of course
changed with the passing of the Federal Arbitration Act. However, until
recently, these pre-dispute agreements were not used by businesses to
require employees to resolve disputes.77
1. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
In order to understand why mandatory arbitration became widely
acceptable, one must understand how the Supreme Court interprets the
Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). 78 When Congress passed the FAA
in 1925 it required courts to grant motions to compel arbitration pursuant
to arbitration agreements.79 The FAA provides that “an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract… shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”80 Therefore, under the FAA, parties entering into an
72. William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A
Brief Survey, WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 194 (1956) (examining uses of arbitration in New York,
beginning with the Dutch West India Company in the 1600s, and concluding that “arbitration
has been an important means of deciding disputes since the earliest days of European
settlement in New York in the seventeenth century”).
73. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1635.
74. Id. (citing GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7–11 (2d
ed. 2001)). Arbitration agreements are typically more enforceable in foreign countries than
are court decrees because over one hundred countries have adopted the New York Convention
requiring them to enforce arbitral awards issued by other signatory countries.
75. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1636.
76. See, e.g., Tobey v. Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1319–23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
14,065) (refusing to use equitable powers to enforce pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate).
77. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1636.
78. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at
9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2000)).
79. Id.
80. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stressing that arbitration agreements entered into voluntarily
will be upheld).
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arbitration agreement are contractually bound to arbitrate any dispute
that arises under said contract.81
A series of Supreme Court decisions then expanded the FAA’s
reach to cover almost all employment contracts, regardless of whether
the parties actually had an opportunity to bargain or negotiate the
terms.82 Since then, the number of arbitration agreements has increased
exponentially.
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Leading to the Emergence of
Mandatory Arbitration
Section 2 of the FAA states that “a written provision in . . . a
contract evidencing a transaction . . . arising out of such contract . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”83 In Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction,84 the Court
interpreted Section 2 of the FAA as Congress’ way of promoting a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration.85 The Court explained that because
the FAA favors arbitration, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.86 The practical impact
of this decision is that whenever courts must decide whether a claim can
be resolved through arbitration, the court’s decision will be slanted
towards arbitration.
The significant rise of mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts that followed Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
can be attributed to a line of United States Supreme Court cases that
permitted the use of arbitration in situations that businesses had never
previously thought acceptable.87 In the first significant case regarding
mandatory arbitration in the employment context, Alexander v. GardnerDenver,88 the Supreme Court found that a compulsory arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude a Title VII federal

81. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (emphasizing
that a party making an agreement to arbitrate should be held to that decision).
82. See infra Section II.C.ii.
83. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925).
84. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
85. Id. at 24 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”).
86. Id. at 24–25.
87. See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, Report, The Arbitration
Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of their Rights,
ECONOMIC POLICY INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitrationepidemic/.
88. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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claim.89 This meant that an employee had both a contractual right to
submit a race discrimination grievance to arbitration and an independent
statutory right to file a lawsuit under Title VII.90 This decision weakened
the influence of mandatory arbitration clauses in reference to
employment contracts, but only temporarily.91
In 1991, the Court’s attitude toward arbitration had changed, as
evidenced by its holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.92 In
Gilmer, the Court held that individual statutory claims brought under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“AEDA”) may be subject to
valid pre-dispute arbitration agreements.93 In rejecting the plaintiff’s
argument that arbitration of age discrimination was inconsistent with the
ADEA’s purpose, the Court explained that an agreement to arbitrate an
ADEA claim is not a waiver of substantive rights, but merely an
agreement to resolve claims arising from those rights “in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.”94 The Court reasoned that “so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function.”95 This idea was subsequently applied
by lower courts to hold that claims arising under Title VII may also be
the subject of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.96
Gilmer also held that the FAA manifests a “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements,” and preempts state statutes that
conflict with this approach.97 Thereby effectively making the FAA the

89. Id. at 48–49 (inferring that Title VII supplements, rather than supplants, existing laws
relating to employment discrimination).
90. Id. at 49–50 (the Court reasoned that although arbitration is efficient and inexpensive
the informal proceedings were not the correct forum for deciding statutory claims); Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that prohibits sexual harassment. 29 U.S.C. §
2000e-2. Under Title VII, harassment based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion
constitutes discrimination. Id.
91. Although the Court today recognizes arbitration as an appropriate forum for
adjudicating an individual’s statutory claim, it has not expressly overruled Gardner-Denver;
in later decisions the Court has found arbitration appropriate, as it provides a neutral forum
for dispute resolution, so long as individual substantive rights are protected. See Roma, supra
note 6, at 525.
92. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
93. Id. at 35. Gilmer argued that requiring arbitration of employment discrimination
claims would be inconsistent with public policy and undermine the role of the EEOC, but the
Court rejected both arguments. Id. at 26–29.
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id. at 28.
96. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 749–50 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (ADA and Title VII); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (Title VII); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc.,
167 F.3d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 1999) (Title VII).
97. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24–25 (reasoning that the FAA’s purpose was to “reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common
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law of all lands. However, because the agreement at issue in Gilmer was
within a securities registration application, and not an employment
contract, the Court ultimately failed to address whether Section 1 of the
FAA applied to all employment contracts.98 This question remained
unsolved.99
Ten years later, the Court addressed Gilmer’s unsolved question in
Circuit City Stores v. Adams.100 There, the Court expressly ruled that
the FAA applied to all employment contracts except for those
specifically exempted.101 This interpretation was extremely narrow
because the FAA only exempts employment contracts of transportation
workers.102 Circuit City Stores reinforced case law from lower federal
courts and further encouraged the use of mandatory arbitration
contracts.103
After the Supreme Court issued these decisions, which asserted that
arbitration is “favored” and permitted, businesses jumped at the
opportunity to compel arbitration in contexts where they previously
assumed such agreements would not be enforced.104
D. Mandatory Arbitration Today
Since Gilmer,105 arbitration has become a preferred method of
dispute resolution for many employers who view it as faster and more
cost effective than litigation.106 Today, more than fifty-five percent of
law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts.”).
98. Id. at 26 (holding that arbitration may not be appropriate for all statutory claims and
that in determining whether arbitration is suitable, courts should look to the text of the statute,
its legislative history, and whether or not there is an “inherent conflict” between the statutory
purpose and arbitration).
99. Although the majority in Gilmer did not address whether the FAA applied to
employment contracts, the dissent discussed the issue and concluded that Congress did not
intend for the FAA to apply to employment contracts at all. See id. at 39–41. Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote “[T]he FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration agreements
between employees and employers.” Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
101. Id. at 122–23.
102. Id. at 119.
103. Landry, supra note 24, at 488 (“The Circuit City decision clarified the broad scope
of the FAA and seemed to affirm employers’ use of mandatory arbitration provisions in
employment contracts”).
104. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1638.
105. 500 U.S. at 26.
106. Bales, supra note 19; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy Statement, reprinted in 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at
E-4 (July 17, 1995) (recognizing that if the circumstances are appropriate that ADR techniques
can provide “faster, less expensive, less contentious, and more productive results in
eliminating workplace discrimination”); see Bingham, supra note 61, at 189 (citing to studies
that provide evidence of increase between 1991 and 1995 in number of employers using
predispute employment arbitration agreements); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,
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nonunion, private-sector employees are bound by arbitration clauses.107
Of the employers who require mandatory arbitration, about thirty percent
include class action waivers—meaning that employees also lose their
right to pursue collective legal action to address widespread rights
violations.108
Over this same period of time, however, state legislatures and
courts have sought to regulate and invalidate various forms of arbitration
agreements that they believed to be threatening to the interests of the
state, its businesses, and its employers.109 However, most of the attempts
to pass legislation or implement case law contrary to mandatory
arbitration have been preempted by the FAA.
It is unclear why states nevertheless attempt to pass legislation that
is preempted. Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole, at the Moritz College of
Law, speculated that states may attempt to pass preempted legislation as
a “purely symbolic” gesture, with the hope that such legislation might
spur Congress to amend the FAA to allow states greater leeway to
regulate arbitration.110 Professor Gary Spitko, at Santa Clara University
School of Law, theorized that states might simply perceive the need for
arbitration regulation to be so great that it is in their best interest to
proceed with arguably preempted regulations until the Supreme Court
rules on the preemption of the specific effort at issue.111
E. Recent Legislation Regarding Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace
While the general climate towards mandatory arbitration among
courts and legislatures is positive, many have found mandatory
arbitration agreements to be problematic in the context of statutory
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225 (1998) (asserting that “[t]he use of employment
arbitration began to accelerate dramatically after the United States Supreme Court decided
Gilmer”); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) (reviewing
empirical studies and concluding that “[a]lthough there are limitations to the existing studies,
they do show a consistent pattern of significant expansion of employment arbitration in the
decade and a half since the Gilmer decision” and hypothesizing that “employment arbitration
is likely already a more widespread system for governing employment relations than
collective bargaining and labor arbitration”).
107. Colvin, supra note 3.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not
Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL., 759, 785–87 (2001) (discussing various state statutes
that purport to protect certain categories of disputants from compliance with predispute
arbitration agreements).
110. Id. at 789.
111. E. Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of State Public Policy-Based
Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and an Argument for Federal Agency
Oversight, 20 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).
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complaints such as sexual assault, harassment, and discrimination.112 In
recognition of the harms caused by forced arbitration of these types of
complaints, some officials have taken steps to address the issue.113 The
actions taken reflect a general understanding that forced arbitration can
be unfair to employees; however, the measures taken nonetheless fall
short of fully protecting employees.114
In 2009, President Obama signed into law the first federal
legislation that prevents employers from forcing binding arbitration on
their employees.115 The Franken Amendment to the 2010 Defense
Appropriations Bill116 was a small victory for opponents of arbitration,
as it prevented the use of any funds made available under the Defense
Appropriation Act if a contractor or subcontractor providing services or
equipment under the Act requires its employees to arbitrate certain
claims.117 These claims included: those arising under Title VII, or any
torts relating to (or arising out of) sexual assault, harassment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and more.118
However, in the same year the Franken Amendment was passed,
the Rape Victims Act of 2009119 failed. If enacted, the act would have
made any agreement to arbitrate a dispute unenforceable with respect to
claims arising out of rape.120 Unlike the Franken Amendment, the Rape
Victims Act would have applied to all employers, not just to federal
contractors receiving funds under the particular act.121
The approach taken by the Franken Amendment was subsequently
extended to some federal contracts through the Fair Pay and Safe
Workplaces Executive Order of 2014 (“FPSW”).122 The FPSW order
bars all federal contractors with contracts of greater than one million
dollars from enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements in claims based
on Title VII, or tort claims involving sexual assault or harassment.123
112. See generally EEOC Notice, supra note 54; see Landry, supra note 24; see Katherine
V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, Report, The arbitration epidemic: Mandatory
arbitration deprives workers and consumers of their rights, ECONOMIC POLICY INST. (Dec.
7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/.
113. See infra notes 116–29.
114. DAVID SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MODEL STATE CONSUMER &
EMPLOYEE JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT ACT 3 (Nov. 2015),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/model-state-arb-act-2015.pdf.
115. See Dep’t of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118 § 8116, 123
Stat. 3409, 3454 (2010) (Franken Amendment).
116. Id.
117. Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009).
118. Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409 (2009).
119. Rape Victims Act of 2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
120. Id.
121. Id.; see Franken Amendment, supra note 115.
122. Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).
123. Id.
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The FPSW, although another win for opponents of mandatory
arbitration, suffers from similar limitations as the Franken Amendment
did as the Order only applies to a limited number of potential
employment-related claims.
In February 2018, state attorney generals (“AGs”) in all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories wrote a letter to
Congressional leadership seeking the elimination of arbitration clauses
in employment agreements for sex harassment claims.124 In the letter,
the AGs objected to the “veil of secrecy” created by arbitration, which
prevents similarly situated individuals from learning about the
harassment claims, thereby precluding them from also seeking relief.125
The letter also mentions the “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment Act of 2017”126 that is pending in the U.S. Senate. 127 This
legislation would prohibit the enforcement of an arbitration clause for
claims based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.128
Finally, and to this date, the most prominent effort to deal with
mandatory arbitration at the federal level is the proposed Arbitration
Fairness Act (“AFA”).129 Although various versions of the AFA exist,
the most recent version would amend the FAA to specify that”no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires
arbitration of an employment, consumer or franchise dispute, or a
dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”130 If
enacted, the AFA would effectively eliminate all mandatory arbitration
within employment and consumer realms, as well as in antitrust and civil
rights cases.131 The AFA has been repeatedly introduced in Congress,
with versions proposed in 2009, 2011, 2013, and most recently 2015.132
However, the AFA has not received a vote, and passage in the current
Congress appears unlikely.133

124. Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, to Congressional Leadership
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://shpr.legislature.ca.gov/sites/shpr.legislature.ca.gov/files/MusellNAAG%20Letter%20re%20mandatory%20arbitration.pdf [hereinafter Letter from AGs].
125. Id.
126. S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017–2018).
127. See Letter from AGs, supra note 124.
128. S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017–2018).
129. Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, S. 537, 115th Cong. § 402(a).
The AFA was originally proposed in 2009 and the findings then suggested that the bill’s
sponsors were primarily concerned with the inequality of bargaining power between
employers and employees, the lack of meaningful choice, the potential for unfair arbitration
procedures attendant to such inequality, and dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency in
arbitration. H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
130. H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
131. Stone & Colvin, supra note 112.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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F. The “Knowing and Voluntary” Requirement
Some have suggested that Congress impose a requirement that
employees agree to arbitrate Title VII claims “knowingly and
voluntarily.”134 Generally, “knowing” means that an employee is aware
of the arbitration agreement she is entering into, and “voluntary” means
that she is willingly entering into it.135 At one point, the Ninth Circuit
implemented a knowing standard, which required that an employee
knowingly enter into a mandatory arbitration agreement for Title VII
claims.136 In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,137 the Ninth
Circuit held that employers are required to inform employees who sign
pre-dispute agreements that any employment discrimination claims will
be subject to mandatory, binding arbitration.138 The Ninth Circuit’s
standard has been questioned for its failure to define the parameters of a
“knowing” requirement.139 Without establishing these parameters,
employers are left to guess whether their employee “knowingly” agreed
to arbitrate an employment discrimination claim.
In Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp.,140 the Ninth Circuit
clarified the knowing requirement when it rejected an argument that an
agreement to arbitrate an ADA claim could be inferred from the
employer giving an employee an Employee Handbook containing
arbitration provisions.141 The court held that “[a]ny bargain to waive the
right to a judicial forum for civil rights claims . . . in exchange for
employment or continued employment must at the least be express; the
choice must be explicitly presented to the employee and the employee
must explicitly agree to waive the specific right in question.”142
Unfortunately, this standard is quite simple to meet,143and it is
unforeseeable that this standard would make a significant impact on
peoples’ decisions of whether to take a job.
Moreover, as critics of this standard point out, the knowing
requirement will have little effect if the agreement is not also
voluntary.144 Unlike the knowing requirement, no court currently

134. See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 28, 36 (1996).
135. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1907.
136. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1305.
139. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1908.
140. 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 762.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Keeping in mind that many people either do not understand what mandatory
arbitration entails or have limited job prospects.
144. See Grodin, supra note 134, at 37.
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requires that a waiver of Title VII claims be voluntary.145 To require
courts to subjectively determine whether an arbitration clause was
voluntarily entered into poses its own issues. This Note will discuss why
the knowing and voluntary standard does not effectively address the
issues posed by mandatory arbitration in section IV.146
III. ISSUE
Employees are often required to sign arbitration agreements as
conditions of employment.147 In these agreements, employees sign away
their right to litigate employment-related disputes in front of a court, and
instead agree to resolve all future claims—including statutory civil rights
protections found in Title VII—through binding arbitration.148 While
arbitration may be a faster and cheaper alternative to litigation, using the
arbitral forum raises unique problems in the context of civil rights
claims. The problems surrounding the arbitration of Title VII claims
include the nonconsensual nature of mandatory arbitration clauses, the
alleged propensity for arbitral proceedings to be slanted in favor of the
business, and restricted public accountability particularly in regard to
statutory rights such as those under Title VII.149
As a result of the lack of safeguards in place for employee’s rights,
mandatory arbitration may be propagating sexual harassment cultures in
the workplace. Unfortunately, the combination of the FAA and a strong
federal policy favoring mandatory arbitration compels courts to decide
all disputes in favor of mandatory arbitration.150 Thus, in order to
effectively reform the mandatory arbitration system, Congress, and
Congress alone, must take action to create stricter regulations to
safeguard the rights of employees and make arbitration a fair forum for
statutory claims.
IV. ANALYSIS
In 2017, the floodgates sprung open when the media published
sexual harassment allegations made against media mogul Harvey
Weinstein.151 The Weinstein scandal sparked a national conversation
145. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1909.
146. See infra Section IV.D.
147. Eric Kolowitz, “I Didn’t Agree to Arbitrate That!”—How Courts Determine if
Employees’ Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Claims Fall Within the Scope of Broad
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 570 (2012).
148. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section I.
149. See id. at Section C.ii.
150. See id. at Section II.C.
151. Samantha Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual
Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, TIME (Jan. 26, 2018), http://time.com/5015204/harveyweinstein-scandal/.
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about sexual misconduct in the workplace as women from all over felt
encouraged to come forward with allegations of their own against
prominent male figures, ranging from sexual misconduct and harassment
to rape.152 Despite a number of the allegations leading to the men in
question being dismissed or otherwise disciplined,153 the dismissal of
these men remains the exception, not the rule. While these particular
dismissals culminated from the heavy publicity surrounding the
allegations, not all harassment claims are visible to the public eye. Even
some of the individuals hit publicly with harassment charges are
sometimes able to carry on unharmed in their careers. The most
prominent example being President Donald Trump, who was accused of
sexual harassment by several women while in the running for President,
and still succeeded in the 2016 Presidential election.154
In the past seven years, United States companies have paid out more
than $295 million in public penalties over sexual harassment claims.155
Too often, sexual harassment in the workplace remains hidden and
businesses fail to take disciplinary action until they feel threatened by
bad publicity.156 The fact that existing anti-discrimination and
harassment laws, such as Title VII, fail to prevent such culpable actions
tends to suggest that some form of legal reform is needed. The next
section of this analysis seeks to understand the weaknesses in the current
legislation based on a case analysis of Gretchen Carlson and the
harassment scandal at Fox News.
A. How Title VII Failed to Prevent Harassment at Fox News
In the last few years, dozens of women at Fox News came forward
with sexual harassment allegations against men at the Fox network.157
After significant negative press coverage, Fox News was hard pressed to
fire many of the accused, costing the network over eighty million dollars
in pay-outs to the departing executives and settlements to the alleged

152. Id.
153. Corynne Cirilli, High Profile Men Accused of Sexual Harassment and Sexual
Abuse, COVETEUR: NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017), http://coveteur.com/2017/11/29/harveyweinstein-sexual-harassment-repercussions/.
154. Danielle Kurtzleben, Here’s the List of Women Who Accused Donald Trump of
Sexual Misconduct, NPR, Oct. 20, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/10/13/497799354/a-listof-donald-trumps-accusers-of-inappropriate-sexual-conduct.
155. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT FY 2010-FY 2018,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (Jan. 14,
2018).
156. See infra Section IV.A.
157. Kate W. Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of Fox News
for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, PENN. STATE. L. REV. 463, 465 (Aug. 1, 2017).
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victims.158 Despite these charges, the legal prohibitions against sexual
harassment in the workplace failed to deter Fox News from ignoring the
rampant harassment for years. For example, in January of 2016, after
settling multiple cases regarding Bill O’Reilly’s misconduct with female
employees, Fox News nevertheless renewed O’Reilly’s employment
contract.159 Fox News was, at the time, fully aware of the harassment
allegations made against O’Reilly.160 It is likely that the reason Fox
News was able to retain O’Reilly for so long, despite the recurring
allegations, was because the network circumvented anti-harassment laws
through the use of mandatory arbitration clauses.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964161 is a federal law that
prohibits sexual harassment. Under Title VII, harassment based on race,
color, sex, national origin, or religion constitutes discrimination.162
However, Title VII is often critiqued for its failure to deter sexual
harassment in the workplace.163
One established critique of Title VII, regarded as the “standards and
defenses critique,” may partially explain why Title VII fails to have the
deterrent effect desired.164 According to this critique, Title VII
encourages only superficial compliance without actually preventing or
punishing harassment, makes it too difficult for employees to prove their
claims, and fails to adequately protect employees who choose to report
harassment.165 However, the “standards and defenses critique” fails to
fully explain the events that occurred at Fox News because Title VII was
not the only law in play. Fox News is located in New York City, which
is governed by a stricter law prohibiting harassment in the workplace—
the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).166 The NYCHRL
has a lower standard for proving harassment and provides greater
protections against retaliation.167 Nevertheless, even the existence of
this stricter anti-discrimination law failed to deter the widespread
158. Emily Steel & Michael Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as
Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2017.
159. Doug Stanglin, Report: Fox kept Bill O’Reilly despite $32M sexual harassment
settlement, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2017,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/10/21/report-bill-oreilly-struck-sexualharassment-deal-january-former-fox-analyst/787360001/.
160. John Bacon, Bill O’Reilly dismisses NYT report as ‘lies and smears,’ USA TODAY,
Oct. 22, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/10/22/bill-oreillydismissed-nyt-report-lies-and-smears/788461001/.
161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West).
162. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986).
163. See supra note 157.
164. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 700–06 (2000).
165. Id.
166. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(1)(a).
167. Id.; see Nuñez, supra note 157, at 49–96.
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harassment at Fox News. These facts suggest that an effective reform of
discrimination law will take more than merely strengthening a plaintiff’s
individual claims through additional legislation.
1. The Fox News Scandal
Gretchen Carlson joined Fox News in 2005.168 From 2006 to 2013,
Carlson was the co-host of the “Fox & Friends” morning show.169
Carlson alleges that during her time on the Fox program she experienced
sexist and condescending behavior by her co-host, Steve Doocy.170
Carlson first complained to her supervisor about Doocy’s behavior in
September 2009.171 Shortly after Carlson filed this complaint, her work
environment began to change. Carlson alleges that in response to her
complaint, Roger Ailes called her a “man hater” and “killer” who
“needed to learn to ‘get along with the boys.’”172 Carlson further alleges
that Ailes retaliated against her by assigning her fewer interviews,
ending her regular appearances on “The O’Reilly Factor,” failing to
showcase her to the public, and more.173 According to Carlson, this
retaliatory conduct eventually led to her removal from the “Fox &
Friends” program altogether, her reassignment to a less desirable
afternoon slot, and a reduction in pay.174
Carlson’s complaint also listed a variety of harassment claims
against Ailes.175 Some of the alleged actions include: (a) claiming that
Carlson saw everything as if it “only rains on women” and admonishing
her to stop worrying about being treated equally and getting “offended
so God damn easy about everything;” (b) ogling Carlson in his office
and asking her to turn around so he could view her posterior; (c)
commenting that certain outfits enhanced Carlson’s figure and urging
her to wear them every day; (d) commenting repeatedly about Carlson’s
legs; (e) lamenting that marriage was “boring,” “hard,” and “not much
fun;” (f) wondering aloud how anyone could be married to Carlson,
while making sexual advances by various means, including by stating
that if he could choose one person to be stranded with on a desert island,
she would be that person; (g) asking Carlson how she felt about him,
followed by: “Do you understand what I’m saying to you?;” (h) boasting
to other attendees at an event where Carlson walked over to greet him
168. Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 8, Carlson v. Ailes, No. BEL-L-005016-16 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. July 6, 2016) [hereinafter Carlson Complaint].
169. Id. at ¶ 10; GRETCHEN CARLSON, https://www.gretchencarlson.com/about.
170. Carlson Complaint, supra note 168, at ¶ 11.
171. Id.
172. Id. at ¶ 13.
173. Id. at ¶ 14.
174. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17.
175. See generally id. ¶¶20–22.
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that he always stays seated when a woman walks over to him so she has
to “bend over” to say hello; and (i) telling Carlson that she was “sexy,”
but “too much hard work.”176
On June 23, 2016, Fox News refused to renew Carlson’s contract.177
The next month Carlson filed a lawsuit against Ailes individually,
asserting claims of harassment and retaliation under the NYCHRL.178
Instead of suing Fox News under Title VII, Carlson strategically chose
to sue Ailes individually under the NYCHRL because her employment
contract with Fox News required mandatory confidential arbitration of
any claims against the network.179 Ailes attempted to compel arbitration,
but the case reached settlement before the court was able to decide on
the issue.180 While Fox News paid Carlson twenty million dollars to
settle the case,181 they negotiated a price twice as high—forty million
dollars—as a payout to Ailes for his departure.182
Shortly after Carlson filed her suit, another former Fox News host,
Andrea Tantaros, filed a complaint bringing similar sexual harassment
and retaliation allegations against Ailes.183 In her complaint, Tantaros
alleged that Ailes frequently made sexual remarks directed at her and
other Fox News employees about their relationships and sexuality.184
The alleged retaliation against Tantaros for complaining about the
harassment included actions by Fox News media relations personnel
such as: failing to provide media support, denying interview requests of
Tantaros, crafting and placing false and negative stories about Tantaros,
176. Id. ¶ 20.
177. Id. ¶ 25.
178. Id. ¶ 4.
179. The employment agreement between Carlson and Fox News states in relevant part:
“Any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or Performer’s
employment shall be brought before a mutually selected three-member arbitration panel and
held in New York City in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association
then in effect . . . . Such arbitration, all filings, evidence and testimony connected with the
arbitration, and all relevant allegations and events leading up to the arbitration, shall be held
in strict confidence.” Certification of Barry Asen in Support of Defendant Roger Ailes’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration, Exhibit A, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July
8, 2016).
180. See Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay All Further Judicial
Proceedings, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 8, 2016); Order of Voluntarily
Dismissal, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2016); Petition to Compel
Arbitration, Ailes v. Carlson, No. 1:16-cv-5671 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016); Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal, Ailes v. Carlson, No. 1:16-cv-5671 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2016).
181. Bill Chappel, Fox Will Pay Gretchen Carlson $20 Million to Settle Sexual
Harassment Suit, NPR: AMERICA (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/09/06/492797695/fox-news-will-pay-gretchen-carlson-20-million-to-settlesexual-harassment-suit.
182. Nuñez, supra note 157, at 470.
183. Complaint, Tantaros v. Fox News Network, et al., No. 157054/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Tantaros Complaint].
184. Id. at ¶ 5(a)-(e).
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and posting negative social media comments about her using fake
accounts.185 When Tantaros complained of the harassment and
retaliation to senior Fox News executive, William Shine, he allegedly
warned her that Ailes was a “very powerful man” and Tantaros
“need[ed] to let this one go.”186
Turning down a settlement offer in excess of one million dollars to
keep her claims quiet,187 Tantaros instead filed her complaint in New
York State court alleging claims against Fox News and a number of
executives including Ailes.188 This time the defendants were successful
in compelling confidential arbitration,189 and as a result the outcome of
this proceeding remains private. Since the Carlson and Tantaros suits,
many others have come forward and Fox News has reportedly reached
settlements with at least six women who accused Ailes of sexual
harassment.190
One query that arises when reviewing these complaints is whether,
without the high profiles of the victims and defendants involved, there
would have been enough press and media coverage to pressure Fox
News into taking action against the alleged offender? Here, non-legal
forces ultimately led Fox News to fire the perpetrators, but both federal
and state law failed to do so despite years of allegations. This
unfortunate reality begs the question of why it took this long-winded
series of events for Fox to rectify and take action against conduct that is
already prohibited by the law.
2. How Mandatory Arbitration Undermines Laws such as Title VII
While there are laws in existence which protect employees from
sexual harassment, such as Title VII, these laws do a poor job of
deterring such behavior, as evidenced by the happenings at Fox News191
and the exponentially growing number of sexual harassment claims
filed.192 One explanation for why these laws are so easily circumvented
is that mandatory arbitration clauses undermine the law by allowing
employers to secretly pay out victims and brush harassment claims under
the rug. For example, Fox News paid millions of dollars over the years

185. Id. at ¶ 6).
186. Id. at ¶ 7.
187. Nuñez, supra note 157, at 471.
188. Tantaros Complaint, supra note 183, ¶ ¶ 75-98.
189. Nuñez, supra note 157, at 472. (citing Order on Motion to Compel Arbitration,
Tantaros v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 157054/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2017).
190. Emily Steel & Michael Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as
Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2017, at A1.
191. See supra Section IV.A.i.
192. 12,860 claims were filed at the EEOC in 2016 alone. EEOC, supra note 157. This
does not include charges filed at state or local Fair Employment Practice Agencies. Id.
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to settle harassment claims against Bill O’Reilly.193 Since most of these
claims never reached the courtroom, the full extent of O’Reilly’s abuse
was hidden from the public eye.194 Only when Carlson took
extraordinary steps to avoid arbitration did the harassment at Fox News
become a big enough news story to pressure Fox News into dismissing
O’Reilly.195
As a term of employment, Fox News requires many of its
employees to agree to confidential binding arbitration.196 Gretchen
Carlson, for example, was a party to such an agreement.197 Because of
the arbitration clause in her employment contract, Carlson’s only option
for filing a public suit and bringing to light the harassment was suing
Ailes individually.198 However, even her ability to individually sue Ailes
was zealously disputed and remained unresolved before settlement.199 In
fact, her individual cause of action against Ailes would have been
unavailable in most jurisdictions; the NYCHRL allowed Carlson to sue
Ailes individually, an action not permitted under federal law.200 In
addition, while the particular language in Carlson’s contract left some
wiggle room for excluding individual claims against executives from
arbitration, most contracts do not permit this.201 Overall, it was the
culmination of these uncommon circumstances that brought Carlson’s
case into the public eye.

193. Steel & Schmidt, supra note 190.
194. See id.
195. See Carlson Complaint, supra note 168.
196. See Arbitration Agreement Between Gretchen Carlson and Fox News, Exhibit A,
Certification of Barry Asen in Support of Defendant Roger Ailes’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 8, 2016) (containing an Exhibit
A of “Standard Terms and Conditions” which includes the mandatory arbitration clause).
197. Id.
198. See Carlson Complaint, supra note 168; Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Judicial Proceedings, Carlson v. Ailes,
No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 15, 2016).
199. Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay All Further Judicial Proceedings,
Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16- cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 8, 2016); Order of Voluntarily Dismissal,
Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2016); Petition to Compel Arbitration,
Ailes v. Carlson, No. 1:16-cv-5671 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal,
Ailes v. Carlson, No. 1:16-cv-5671 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2016).
200. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(1)(a) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory
practice: (a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof”) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (2015) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . “)
(emphasis added).
201. See Eric Wemple, Roger Ailes Opts for Secrecy, Cowardice, in Face of Gretchen
Carlson Suit, WASHINGTON POST, July 9, 2016 (“Ailes is not named in [the arbitration
agreement]. Their argument is that FOX means Ailes. They should have written more broadly,
most arbitration clauses name others who work for or with, are associated with, etc. I consider
him a non-party under this language. Poor drafting.” (quoting Paul Bland, executive director
of Public Justice)).
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Considering the foregoing, Title VII alone cannot be blamed for its
failure to deter the sexual harassment culture at Fox News. The private,
confidential nature of mandatory arbitration not only keeps sexual
harassment allegations out of court, but also out of the public domain. If
confidential arbitration contributes to the lack of deterrent effect
imposed by existing discrimination laws, then one solution may be to
pursue legislation and encourage activism to make arbitration decisions
more public and subject to greater judicial review. This idea will be
further addressed below.202
B. Inadequacies of the Current Arbitration System in Addressing Title
VII Claims
1. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses are Nonconsensual and
Inherently Unfair
Under even the most reasonable definitions, many would argue that
mandatory arbitration clauses are nonconsensual given that most
employees fail to read, let alone understand, the clauses.203 Even if
employees understand arbitration provisions, the majority lack any
meaningful choice when entering into these agreements because
employers have exclusive control over the terms of the employment
relationship.204 Employees often have no power to bargain for better
terms. This power imbalance results in contracts that are not bargainedfor exchanges. 205 Economic climate further exacerbates the divide in
bargaining power as applicants who are limited in employment options
have little choice but to sign the agreement.206 Despite this lack of
bargained-for exchange, courts continue to uphold arbitration
agreements as a matter of contract.207
When posed with this concern, proponents of mandatory arbitration
will respond by questioning why employment contracts should be
treated or enforced any differently than other contracts. To be
enforceable, a contract requires mutual assent and consideration.208
People sign contracts every day that they fail to read or understand.
202. See infra Sections IV.B.iii & V.
203. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649; see also infra
Section II.B.i.
204. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Private Resolution of Public Disputes: Employment,
Arbitration, and the Statutory Cause of Action, 32 PACE L. REV. 114, 128 (2012).
205. Id. at 125.
206. See Walter J. Gershenfeld, Pre-Employment Dispute Arbitration Agreements: Yes,
No and Maybe, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 245 (1996). Even in 1996, many individuals
who found the job market difficult signed pre-employment agreements because it allowed
them to obtain work: they believed “no alternative [was] available.” Id. at 263.
207. Id. at 246.
208. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 29 (1964).
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These contracts are nevertheless enforced. If courts began to treat
employment contracts differently based on the notion that employees fail
to understand the terms or have unequal bargaining power, and therefore
agree involuntarily, where would the line be drawn?209
However, critics also argue that mandatory arbitration is wrong as
a matter of public policy because it eliminates individuals’ rights to have
a trial before a judge or jury.210 Even in Gilmer, the case that originally
confirmed the use of mandatory arbitration, the Court recognized that
subjecting Title VII claims to mandatory arbitration was inconsistent
with Congress’ goal because Congress had empowered the federal courts
to litigate Title VII claims.211
Title VII was enacted to ensure equal opportunity in employment,
and to secure the fundamental right to equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.212 “Congress explicitly entrusted the primary
responsibility for the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of
these standards, and the public values they embody, to the federal
government.”213 It did so in three ways. First, Congress created the
Commission, initially giving it authority to investigate claims of
discrimination and to interpret the law,214 and subsequently giving it
litigation authority to bring cases to court that it could not resolve
administratively.215 Second, Congress granted certain enforcement
authority to the Department of Justice.216 Third, Congress established a
private right of action to enable aggrieved individuals to bring their
claims directly in federal court, after initially bringing their claims to the
Commission for administrative purposes.217 Mandatory arbitration
effectively does away with this third avenue of enforcement.
This private right of access to courts is an essential part of the
statutory enforcement scheme,218 but mandatory arbitration essentially
“privatizes” the enforcement of federal discrimination laws.219 The
imposition of mandatory arbitration substitutes a private dispute
209. The justification for the “strict judicial respect” for arbitration agreements is based
on a belief that if parties agree to resolve their dispute through arbitration, a court should not
interfere with the parties’ original intent. Evans, supra note 61, at 652–53.
210. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649.
211. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 56 (1991) (expressing that the
goals of arbitration are distinct from the goals of the courts).
212. See EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section V.
213. Id. at Section III.
214. See §§ 706(b), 713 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-12.
215. See § 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
216. See §§ 706(f)(1), 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-6.
217. See § 706(f)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
218. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (granting a
right of action to an injured employee is “a vital element” of Title VII, the ADEA, and the
EPA).
219. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section V.
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resolution system for the public justice system intended by Congress.220
This private arbitral system is different in many ways from the judicial
forum. When issues do arise, such as sexual harassment claims like
those brought by Andrea Tantaros, employees have no avenue to resolve
the dispute except through arbitration.221 In arbitration, employees may
then be pressured into settling their complaints in private, out of sight
from public speculation, and without the chance to hold the offender
publicly accountable.222
2. Mandatory Arbitration Can Be Biased Towards Employees
Critics contend that arbitration proceedings have a tendency to be
biased against the employee.223 Employers imposing mandatory
arbitration through clauses in employment contracts have the ability to
manipulate the arbitral mechanism to their benefit.224
Mandatory arbitration clauses are drafted by employers and
imposed on employees particularly because employers believe them to
be in their own best interest.225 It should thus come as no surprise that
the system may often fall short of being fair. The ability of businesses
to draft agreements in their own favor is made possible by their superior
bargaining power,226 and these agreements consequentially reinforce this
bargaining power. Proponents of arbitration, however, suggest that this
argument applies to litigation just the same, and that employers always
have superior bargaining power and that is the way of business.227
Another argument relevant to biases found in arbitration is that the
employer is at an advantage as the “repeat player.”228 While it is likely
the employer has participated in many arbitration proceedings, the
employee has not.229 As a result, the employee is generally less adept in
making an informed selection of arbitrators than the employer who
knows more about arbitrators’ records.230 However, this same point
could arguably be made about litigation. It is unlikely that an employee,
who is unable to afford representation, will bode well in court against an
experienced attorney representing the employer.
220. Id.
221. Supra Section IV.A.i.
222. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section V(A)(1).
223. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649–50.
224. See supra notes 51–54.
225. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section V(A)(3)(B).
226. Referring to the idea that many employees who apply for a job may take an offered
position without reading the contract, understanding the contract, or simply because they need
the job. See supra Section IV.B.i.
227. Gary E. Spitko, interview (Oct. 3, 2018).
228. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section V(A)(3)(B).
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Finally, opponents argue that arbitrators could be influenced by the
fact that the employer, not the employee, provides them with future
business.231 A recent study of employment law cases revealed this bias,
finding that the more frequently an employer uses arbitration, the better
the employer fared in arbitration.232
3. Confidential Nature of Mandatory Arbitration Leads to a Lack
of Public Accountability
The limited judicial review of arbitration awards results in a general
failure to control and discipline errant arbitrators, to expose employers
to public scrutiny, and to develop new law through precedent.233
For one, arbitrators are hired by private parties and do not have to
answer to public scrutiny.234 “While the courts are charged with giving
force to the public values reflected in the anti-discrimination laws, the
arbitrator proceeds from a far narrower perspective: resolution of the
immediate dispute.”235 Title VII, for example, was created to enforce
the public interest in combating employment discrimination.236
Plaintiffs’ awards in Title VII lawsuits, especially the larger and more
well-known ones, often serve as a notice to the public of the extreme
costs of permitting discrimination in the workplace.237
While published decisions by courts expose the identities of the
accused, private arbitration awards keep these identities hidden.238 “The
risks of negative publicity and blemished business reputation can be
powerful influences on behavior.”239 Without a public trial, there may
be less negative publicity, which translates into less incentive for
employers to act fairly toward employees.240 As a result, arbitration

231. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J.
916, 936 (1979) (“an arbitrator could improve his chances of future selection by deciding
favorably to institutional defendants: as a group, they are more likely to have knowledge about
past decisions and more likely to be regularly involved in the selection process”).
232. See CLIFF PALEFSKY, MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION: IS IT FAIR AND
VOLUNTARY?, H.R. REP, at 6 (2009); Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, Cornell University ILR School Site (2011),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/577.
233. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1911–12.
234. Id.
235. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section V(A)(1).
236. See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 777 (1990) (“[T]here is a tension between the tradition of limited
judicial review of arbitration awards and the presence of an independent public interest
ensuring that the law is correctly and consistently applied . . . “).
237. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1912 (“Publicity can clarify contested issues, and deter
future behavior by publicizing the high damages awarded for egregious conduct.”).
238. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1915.
239. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section IV(C).
240. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1915.
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permits the immediate resolution of disputes, but fails to uphold the
public values behind the law.241
Furthermore, arbitration affords very little opportunity for the
development of new legal precedent due to the limited judicial review of
arbitrators’ decisions.242 This too deters public accountability because
the absence of new legal standards permits offenders to get away with
such acts. Not only is development of the law stifled, but individual
decisions by arbitrators are virtually free from scrutiny.243 Higher courts
and Congress are therefore unable to correct the potential errors of
statutory interpretation made by arbitrators.244
Finally, the unavailability of judicial review or private arbitration
undermines existing antidiscrimination laws.245 Because arbiters may
apply Title VII law in conflicting manners, employers and employees
may become confused, or may lack a uniform understanding or
definition of discrimination.246 This issue is also explored in Section
IV(A)(ii) above and a proposal identifying one way to address it is
introduced in Section V below.
C. Working Around the FAA’s Preemption of State Legislation
More recently, federal agencies, legislators, and commentators
alike have expressed their concerns pertaining to mandatory arbitration
of statutory civil rights claims.247 Some actors have taken steps to try to
mitigate the negative effects of such agreements.248 Currently, the most
prominent effort to deal with mandatory arbitration at a federal level is
241. “A common critique of arbitration is that without a jury there is no opportunity for
an exercise of local judgement in evaluating whether the conduct at issue is acceptable to the
community.” Id.
242. Review is limited because the standard for judicial review is difficult to meet. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (holding a court will only vacate an arbitration
decision for substantive reasons if the opposing party can show a “manifest disregard” of the
law), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); see also Bell Aerospace Co. v. Int’l Union 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y.
1973) (explaining that the FAA set the standard that “manifest disregard” of the law entails
that the arbitrator “understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.”).
243. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at V(A)(2).
244. Id.
245. See Jennifer N. Manuszak, Pre-Dispute Civil Rights Arbitration in the Nonunion
Sector: The Need for a Tandem Reform Effort at the Contracting, Procedural and Judicial
Review Stages, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 387, 428 (1997).
246. Id. (“The danger is great that individual private employment arbitrators will apply a
law such as Title VII in a conflicting manner; such danger largely goes unchecked because of
the unavailability of judicial review.”).
247. See Section II.E.
248. David Seligman, Model State Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement Act:
Protecting Consumers, Employees, and States from the Harms of Forced Arbitration Through
State-Level Reforms, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 58, 59 (2016) (describing several federal
efforts to limit the use of forced arbitration).

516

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:59

the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (“AFA”).249 Various versions of
this statute have been proposed,250 but the most recent version seeks to
amend the FAA to specify that “no pre-dispute arbitration agreement
shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment
dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”251
Although the AFA has drawn the support of many scholars,252 it is
unlikely to pass in the current political climate.253 However, without
some other form of federal action, it is likely that the FAA will continue
to preempt most state laws that attempt to limit forced arbitration.254
Despite these attempts to address the issues that stem from
mandatory arbitration, the system today remains inadequate in
protecting employees’ rights. In light of this reality, the National
Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”) proposed a Model State Consumer
and Employee Justice Enforcement Act (the “Model Act”)255 to provide
model language for alternative state solutions.256 The Model Act was
designed to mitigate the harms of arbitration while still operating within
the confines of state action available under the FAA.257 While there are
many arguments that such regulations would nevertheless be preempted
by the FAA, states can still look to the Model Act for examples of
potential solutions.
249. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, S. 537, 115th Cong.
250. Stone & Colvin, supra note 112 (different version of the AFA were proposed in 2009,
2011, and 2013).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 468
(2011); Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 8, at 726; Imre Stephen Szalai,
More than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion and American Express on
Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 55–56 (2014).
253. For example, the AFA has no Republican co-sponsors in either the House or Senate.
See H.R. 1374, S. 537. Critics argue that the AFA is too broad and that a “blanket prohibition
on the enforcement of arbitration clauses” is unwarranted. Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth
J. Martin, & Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133,
182 (2012).
254. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Seligman, supra note 248,
at 62.
255. See Seligman, supra note 248.
256. See generally id.
257. Seligman, supra note 248, at 62. Although, the FAA preempts any state law that
limits forced arbitration, the proponents of the Model Act see room for state action in: (a)
using state’s public enforcement and procurement powers to protects its own financial and
enforcement interests; (b) regulating the formation of arbitration agreements rather than their
enforcement; (c) unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements “as long as what
renders such clauses unfair is not a ‘fundamental’ attribute of arbitration;” (d) limiting
enforcement of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, contracts regarding
transportation workers, and contracts that do not involve interstate commerce or when the
parties agree state law applies, areas exempted from FAA preemption; (e) regulating private
companies that administer arbitrations; (f) drafting procedures for litigating questions about
arbitration in state court. Id. at 62–63.
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Title I of the Model Act allows private attorneys generals to bring
actions on behalf of the state and its interests.258 Under many state
employment statutes, private actions are supplementary to an underlying
state right to bring its own enforcement proceedings.259 However,
because States generally lack the budget to play a substantial
enforcement role, Title I proposes to delegate the state enforcement
power to private attorneys.260 This could encourage private attorneys to
take on more of these cases.261
Title II of the Model Act prohibits the state from contracting with
any companies that use forced arbitration in their contracts with either
consumers or employees.262 This utilizes a State’s marketplace power to
discourage businesses from using mandatory arbitration clauses in their
employment contracts.263 Title III of the Model Act aims to protect
employees at the formation of an agreement by requiring arbitration
contracts to “adequately disclose terms and condition[s].”264 Title IV of
the Model Act creates rebuttable presumptions that certain mandatory
arbitration provisions are unconscionable, such as: inconvenient venues,
waiver of rights to seek remedies provided by statute, waiver of right to
seek punitive damages, and a requirement that the individual pay costs
of arbitration that exceed the court cost of bringing a state or federal
claim.265 In addition to these provisions, the Model Act offers four other
sections aimed at the areas of arbitration law not preempted by federal
law.266
The Model Act was drafted as an idea for states to pass nonpreempted laws directed at mandatory arbitration. However, due to a
258. Id. at 61.
259. Id. at 60–61.
260. Seligman, supra note 248, at 65. (“A person may initiate on behalf of the State an
action alleging violations of [designated State consumer and worker protection statutes] to
recover civil penalties on behalf of the State and to seek injunctive, declaratory, or other
equitable relief that the State would itself be entitled to seek.”)
261. For an argument as to why this type of “Iskanian” doctrine would be preempted by
the FAA, see Spitko, supra note 111.
262. Seligman, supra note 248, at 31. (“The State shall not do business with any person
or any of its parent entities or subsidiaries if that person includes forced arbitration clauses in
any of its contracts with consumers or employees . . .”).
263. See id. at 33.
264. Id. at 39 (“This title applies to contracts [the categories of which are to be determined
by each state] formed after this Title’s effective date that meet any one of the following three
criteria: (a) An employment or consumer contract not written in plain language that an average
consumer or employee would understand; (b) An employment or consumer contract not
written in the language in which the transaction was conducted, unless it can be proven that
fewer than ten percent (10%) of the entity’s transactions are conducted in that language; or
(c) if a consumer contract, all of the material terms are not found in a single document.”). For
an argument as to why this would be preempted by the FAA, see Spitko, supra note 111.
265. Id. at 43.
266. Id. at 48–55.
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concern that their efforts will be preempted by federal law, many states
do not even attempt to draft such legislation.267 Similar regulations,
adopted by Congress, would allow employees and employers alike to
reap the benefits of mandatory arbitration while avoiding the negative
aspects employees often face. Whereas state-level legislative action
always runs the risk of being challenged under the FAA, legislation
passed by Congress would encounter no such issue.
D. Why the “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard Would Fail to Address
the Inadequacies of Mandatory Arbitration
In Part II(F)268 this Note discussed the idea of implementing a
“knowing and voluntary” standard for arbitration agreements. This type
of standard aims to address the concern that employees sign away their
rights to litigate future complaints involuntarily due to a lack of
understanding of the agreement.269 In making the dispute resolution
process fairer, some believe that a higher standard of consent would
ensure that employees are fully aware of their decision when they accept
an arbitration agreement.270 The “knowing and voluntary” standard has
been suggested as a mechanism for doing so.271 Generally, “knowing”
means that an employee is aware of the arbitration agreement she is
entering into, and “voluntary” means that she is willingly entering into
it.272
Some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, have attempted to
implement a variation of this standard. In Prudential, the Ninth Circuit
required that an employee knowingly enter into mandatory arbitration
for any Title VII claims.273 However, this standard only mandated that
an arbitration agreement be express, which can be objectively measured
by examining the language of the agreement.274 Requiring an express
statement acknowledging mandatory arbitration in an employment

267. Seligman, supra note 248 at 63.
268. See infra Section F.
269. See Siderman, supra note 25, at 1889–90.
270. Id.
271. The knowing and voluntary language originated in a footnote in Gardner-Denver and
was used in floor debates preceding the passage of the CRA. See Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (“In determining the effectiveness of any such
waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee’s consent. . .was
voluntary and knowing.”). During floor debates over the CRA, Senator Robert Dole stated
that Section 118 encouraged arbitration only when “parties knowingly and voluntarily elect
to use these methods.” 137 CONG. REC. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
272. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1907.
273. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
274. Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1997).
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contract may be helpful to employees who read and understand the
clause, but does little to ensure that the agreement is also “voluntary.”
No court has attempted to implement a requirement that waivers of
Title VII claims be voluntary.275 Simply having a “knowing”
requirement without the “voluntary” counterpart will have little effect in
balancing the scales for employees. Unfortunately, requiring a
“voluntary” requirement may unintentionally cause more issues than it
prevents because a true voluntary waiver of statutory rights can only
apply after a dispute has arisen.276 Proponents of the voluntary
requirement argue that an employee’s consent to a nonnegotiable term
of employment cannot be voluntary, and thus neither can mandatory
arbitration agreements.277 Based on this interpretation, imposing a
voluntary requirement on arbitration would effectively eliminate
mandatory arbitration agreements altogether.278 This may be the reason
courts have yet to insist on such a standard.
Another reason courts may dislike the voluntary standard is because
of its potential to increase timely and costly litigation. Whether or not
an arbitration clause is voluntarily entered into requires a subjective
determination.279 This necessitates a close evaluation of an employee’s
state of mind.280 Such a heightened standard would open every
mandatory arbitration agreement to debate, as employees and employers
would argue over whether the agreement was actually entered into
knowingly and voluntarily.281 Instead of fixing the arbitration system, a
“knowing and voluntary” standard might derail it.282 If litigation was an
expected side effect, it would no longer be worthwhile to use the
arbitration system, which was designed to be efficient and cost
effective.283 Regardless, any such voluntary standard is likely preempted
by the FAA.284 While some courts and legislatures nevertheless permit
275. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1909 (“The EEOC and most commentators agree that a
voluntary waiver of statutory rights can only apply after a dispute has arisen.”).
276. Id.
277. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 83, 107 (1996).
278. See id.
279. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1909.
280. Id.
281. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1358 (1997) (explaining that the determination of whether
a contract was voluntarily entered into “will be subject to the vagaries of after-the-fact
litigation” and will “inject an additional element of uncertainty” into determining whether the
agreements are binding).
282. Which is why this type of regulation would also be likely pre-empted by the FAA.
283. See Estreicher, supra note 281, at 1358–59.
284. A state law may not “stand [] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives” of the FAA. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 477–78 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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and enforce such standards, they are likely to be overturned by the
Supreme Court.285
Finally, if pre-dispute arbitration clauses were completely
voluntary, they would be optional. If mandatory arbitration became
optional, most employers would not voluntarily choose to arbitrate their
claims.286 Employees would not have the resources to pursue lesser
claims and would have a hard time finding lawyers to represent them.287
Thus, employers, knowing that most employees lack the resources to
bring smaller claims to court, would have no incentive to voluntarily
arbitrate the same claim.288 “If, however, employers are bound to
arbitrate by a compulsory arbitration agreement, minor as well as more
formidable claims will be heard.”289
Oftentimes when critics of mandatory arbitration suggest that it
should be rid of altogether, they overlook its potential benefits.
Mandatory arbitration is not an inherently negative facet of the legal
world. Instead of implementing a “knowing and voluntary” standard, or
trying to forbid mandatory arbitration altogether, the arbitration system
needs to be improved. By providing a controlled system of arbitration,
reformed to accommodate the needs of employees, the goals of the
“knowing and voluntary” standard can be met without deterring from the
usefulness and effectiveness of arbitration.
V. PROPOSAL
Although mandatory arbitration is not a characteristically malicious
alternative to dispute resolution, there are many aspects of mandatory
arbitration that must be safeguarded in order to prevent large businesses
from taking advantage of employees’ lack of bargaining power.
Specifically, Congress must account for the shortcomings of arbitration
to ensure that employees receive the rights Congress intended when
drafting Title VII. After identifying the problems in the current
arbitration system, Congress must take the lead in implementing change,
because most state actions regarding mandatory arbitration will be
subjected to scrutiny or preempted without some sort of amendment to
the FAA.

285. See Spitko, supra note 111 at 8.
286. “There was credible testimony by management representatives before the Dunlop
Commission that employers would generally not be willing to enter into post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate.” U.S. DEPT’S OF COMM. & LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT: COMM’N
ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS 118 (May 1994).
287. St. Antoine, supra note 42, at 8.
288. See Siderman, supra note 25, at 1894.
289. Id.
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The most direct way to address the issues mandatory arbitration
poses to statutory rights, such as Title VII, is for Congress to amend the
FAA to exempt all arbitration of such claims. However, the current
political climate towards eradicating mandatory arbitration altogether is
not friendly,290 and completely eliminating mandatory arbitration is not
the best solution.291 Another alternative is exempting from the FAA
arbitration of discrimination claims under Title VII.292 An apparent issue
with this is that if Congress exempted only discrimination claims,
employees bringing several claims against employers would be forced
to split their claims between arbitration and litigation. This would be
extremely costly for both sides and would defeat the efficiency rationale
behind mandatory arbitration.
While many critics of arbitration propose drastic changes and
amendments to the FAA, the reality is that Congress is unlikely to alter
the FAA in such an extreme manner.293 Instead, this author proposes
that we take the middle ground and push for Congress to amend the FAA
in a manner that gives States more regulation power over employment
arbitration as to protect the interests of workers related to state and
federal statutory schemes such as Title VII. This approach would allow
each state to tailor their arbitration laws to address the concerns and
needs specific to its employees.
Accordingly, this author proposes that Congress amend the FAA to
limit its preemptive scope by granting States the authority to establish
various procedural regulations on arbitral proceedings. Specifically, the
procedures States should regulate are: (1) greater judicial review of
arbitration decisions,294 (2) written, non-confidential opinions with

290. Supra note 253.
291. See supra Section IV.D (arguing that as contrasted with litigation, employment
arbitration offers a more knowledgeable, cost-effective, and expeditious adjudication of a
dispute. A complete ban on mandatory arbitration would not serve these interests well).
292. On December 6, 2017, after this note was drafted, Representative Cheri Bustos and
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment
Act of 2017. S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017-2018). Senate Bill 2203 states that “no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex
discrimination dispute,” defined as “a dispute between an employer and employee arising out
of conduct that would form the basis of a claim based on sex under Title VII.” Id. The bill is
pending before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. Id.
293. In recent years, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress proposing to
invalidate mandatory arbitration agreements to various extents - the most extreme blankly
invalidating all mandatory arbitration clauses. Spitko, supra note 111, at 50, n.223. None of
these bills has been politically viable. Id. at 50.
294. Currently, the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award under the FAA are
extremely limited. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (permitting judicial review of any award procured
by “corruption, fraud, or undue means,” arbitrator misconduct, or exceeded authority).
Because arbitral proceedings are often slanted in favor of employers, judicial review is
necessary to even out the imbalance for employees. See supra Section III.B.iii. In order for
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reasons,295 (3) increased discovery, (4) access to information in choosing
an arbitrator,296 (5) jointly and neutrally selected arbitrators who are
trained and qualified,297 (6) cost of arbitration,298 and (7) non-waivable
remedies.299 These procedural protections will address many of the
concerns discussed in this comment while serving the best interests of
all parties. While organizations such as the AAA and JAMS already
require many of these rules, not every employment contract is governed
by these organizations and these rules are not binding law.
Of course, the concern with such an amendment would be the
power it gives States to regulate arbitration in favor of employees while
ignoring the interests of employers.300 However, considering employers
generally have the upper hand in employment disputes, this concern
seems to pale in comparison to the current need for mandatory arbitration
reform.
With the ongoing #MeToo movement301 and media attention
surrounding mandatory arbitration, now is the perfect time to lobby for
change. There is no quick fix. This requires a cultural shift—it will take
work in every industry, on all rungs of employment, everywhere.

judicial review to exist, there must also be written records. See id. Increasing judicial review
will also permit development of the law. See id.
295. This would allow arbitration participants, the EEOC, and Congress to study past
decisions when choosing arbitrator, deciding to settle a case, and determining whether the law
was correctly applied. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 12, at 120.
296. The ability to choose an arbitrator is already part of most systems, but giving
employees more information about arbitrators, particularly costs, histories, and past decisions
(which would also require access to written decisions) would give employees the opportunity
to choose an arbitral that is fairer. A roster of qualified arbitrators should be provided for
employees to select from.
297. I suggest that arbitrators need knowledge of the statutory issues in the dispute. Some
sort of formal training program should be implemented to ensure that arbitrators are qualified
for their important role.
298. Placing the arbitral fee on the employer would make arbitral proceedings fairer as
employees would not be required to pay for a judge in court. Lessening the financial burden
for employees may increase the likelihood that an employee who has suffered from
discrimination will bring a claim. An alternative to this would be cost-splitting, which would
actually deal with the “repeat player” issue more effectively.
299. In Martens v. Smith Barney, the court held that arbitration agreements waiving the
remedies of Title VII to be unenforceable, including attorney’s fees, monetary relief, and
equitable remedies. 181 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). While employers may not be as eager
to enter arbitration if these remedies are available, the expediency of arbitration over litigation
will nevertheless reduce employers’ overall costs and maintain arbitration as a desirable forum
for employers. Id.
300. For a thorough discussion of this concern and another approach that deals with such
concern, see Spitko, supra note 111, at 52.
301. The #MeToo movement has gained nationwide notoriety, building a community of
survivors and bringing vital conversations about sexual violence into mainstream society.
The movement seeks to de-stigmatize survivors by highlighting the breadth and impact
sexual violence has on thousands of women. ME TOO, https://metoomvmt.org/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2017).
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Individuals should continue to contact their state and federal
representatives, initiate petitions, contact people running for elected
positions, and voice their grievances. The current movement has not
gone unnoticed by political power figures.302
While some states may be encouraged to change their arbitration
proceedings, there will not be widespread reform of the arbitration
system until a broad regulatory scheme is enacted for arbitration of Title
VII (or other statutory) claims. Congress or the Supreme Court must
clarify the scope of the FAA, and then Congress must amend the FAA
to set specific guidelines on how mandatory arbitration clauses may be
written and how arbitration proceedings must be regulated. A formal
arbitral system controlled by law will increase the viability of arbitral
forums for Title VII disputes and thereby reduce the risk of unfair
arbitral proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employers across the country utilize the arbitration system to
resolve civil rights disputes. Supreme Court jurisprudence in favor of
mandatory arbitration enables large employers to force their employees
into arbitration to resolve practically all types of claims. Arbitration
provides employees with a sure forum and an experienced decision
maker. Arbitration is also quicker and less expensive than litigation.
These benefits, however, are currently outweighed by the need to
provide substantive relief of statutory claims. Mandatory arbitration
clauses allow corporations to both write the rules that govern their
contracts with workers and design the procedures used to interpret and
apply these rules when disputes arise. Without stricter regulation,
mandatory arbitration leads to a greater imbalance in power between
employers and employees, and its confidential nature deters from the
preventative efforts of anti-harassment laws such as Title VII.
The current mandatory arbitration system is ill-equipped to fairly
settle civil rights claims and requires reform. This is demonstrated by
the failure of existing anti-discrimination laws to prevent rampant
harassment in the workplace, such as in the Fox News example discussed
above. If employees are required to arbitrate Title VII claims, the
procedures should include specific protections of their interests,
preventing employers from taking advantage of the system. To ensure
302. After Senate Bill 2203 was introduced all fifty state attorneys general threw their
support behind the bill by writing a letter to both Senate and House Representatives asking,
“for your support and leadership in enacting needed legislation to protect the victims of
sexual harassment in the workplace.” Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys General, to
Congressional Leadership (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Documents/Articles/AGs-letter.pdf.
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protection of employees’ substantive rights the system requires
additional safeguards such as written public opinions, training programs
for arbitrators, non-waivable remedies, and increased judicial review to
ensure that the law is correctly interpreted and applied. Congress must
amend the FAA to give States more discretion to make these reforms in
order to establish arbitration as a fair option for both employees and
employers.
Even if Congress were to implement these changes, arbitration
would still serve its intended function of providing faster and less
expensive relief. If such protections existed and were enforced, perhaps
harassment in the workplace would not run rampant and well-known
men such as Harvey Weinstein would not get away with over thirty years
of misconduct. Adopting clear procedural protections and measures will
lead to a fair arbitration system for the arbitration of Title VII disputes.

